In this post I have amalgamated all the key policy making documents that I feel are game changing for the Ummah in 2015. These are all a must read for all Muslims, to be aware of the plots and plans of the West.
A 2006 36-page document out of the “Burma Campaign UK” explicitly details the enormous amount of money and resources both the US government and its corporate-funded foundations have poured into Suu Kyi’s image and her “movement.”
In November 2007, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point received nearly 700 records of foreign nationals that entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. The data compiled and analyzed in this report is drawn from these personnel records, which was collected by al‐Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates, first the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The records contain varying levels of information on each fighter, but often include the fighter’s country of origin, hometown, age, occupation, the name of the fighter’s recruiter, and even the route the fighter took to Iraq. The records were captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in a raid near Sinjar, along Iraq’s Syrian border. Although there is some ambiguity in the data, it is likely that all of the fighters listed in the Sinjar Records crossed into Iraq from Syria. The Sinjar Records’ existence was first reported by The New York Times’ Richard Oppel, who was provided a partial summary of the data. English translations of the Records can be accessed at
- Removing the regime via diplomacy;
- Coercing the regime via sanctions and diplomatic isolation;
- Arming the Syrian opposition to overthrow the regime;
- Engaging in a Libya-like air campaign to help an opposition army gain victory;
- Invading Syria with U.S.-led forces and toppling the regime directly; and
- Participating in a multilateral, NATO-led effort to oust Asad and rebuild Syria.
This paper makes a case for a new approach to Syria that attempts to bring ends and means more realistically into balance. It also seeks to end the Hobson’s choice currently confronting American policymakers, whereby they can neither attempt to unseat President Assad in any concerted way (because doing so would clear the path for ISIL), nor tolerate him as a future leader of the country (because of the abominations he has committed, and because any such policy would bring the United States into direct disagreement with almost all of its regional allies). The new approach would seek to break the problem down in a number of localized components of the country, pursuing regional stopgap solutions while envisioning ultimately a more confederal Syria made up of autonomous zones rather than being ruled by a strong central government. It also proposes a path to an intensified train and equip program. Once that program had generated a critical mass of fighters in training locations abroad, it would move to a next stage. Coupled with a U.S. willingness, in collaboration with regional partners, to help defend local safe areas using American airpower as well as special forces support once circumstances are conducive, the Syrian opposition fighters would then establish safe zones in Syria that they would seek to expand and solidify. The safe zones would also be used to accelerate recruiting and training of additional opposition fighters who could live in, and help protect, their communities while going through basic training. They would, in addition, be locations where humanitarian relief could be provided to needy populations, and local governance structures developed.
- To concentrate on brokering a comprehensive political arrangement among the warring Syrian parties and their external sponsors, including the reform of state institutions, the formation of a new government, and a plan for elections, accompanied by a ceasefire and the beginning of a process of reconstruction.
- To secure agreement to an immediate ceasefire, which would be followed by further negotiations on the shape of a reconstituted Syrian state and government.
It advises the White House to take the second path into regionalising Syria into three safe zones, i.e. Alawi/Assad region, Kurds Region, Opposition/Rebel region. The rest of Syria will then be deemed to be ISIS held and targeted for mass killings by all three regions cooperatively including the international arena.
Rethinking Political Islam is the first project of its kind to systematically assess the evolution of mainstream Islamist groups across 12 country cases—Egypt, Tunisia,Morocco, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Pakistan, as well as Malaysia and Indonesia. The project engages scholars of political Islam through in-depth research and dialogue to consider how the Arab uprisings and their aftermath have shaped—and in some cases altered—the strategies, agendas, and self-conception of Islamist movements.